(1) We would like to thank Raquel Carrasco for her valuable suggestions and Lucía Cuadro for her excellent research assistance. W e are also grateful for comments from Guillermo Le Fort, Klaus SchmidtHebbel, Ugo Panizza, Javier Valles, an anonymous referee, and participants to seminars in the Kiel Institute of World Economics, Banco de España, and the Euro-Latin IADB network on regional integration. Remaining errors are only ours. Finally, the opinions expressed are those of the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco de España. (2) Banco de España (jcberganza@bde.es) (3) Rutgers University.( chang@econ.rutgers.edu). Much of Chang's work for this project was completed while a visiting scholar at Banco de España, whose hospitality he acknowledges with gratitude. He also thanks the National Science Foundation for financial support. (4) Banco de España ( alicia.garcia -herrero@bde.es)
INTRODUCTION
Conventional open economy models, and in particular the influential Mundell-Fleming model, imply that a real devaluation switches demand towards domestic production and is expansionary.
But recent theories on credit constraints and balance sheet effects have challenged this view. The argument starts with the observation that if a country has a large debt with the rest of the world, and the value of the debt depends on the real exchange rate, a devaluation causes a fall in the country's net worth. In the presence of financial imperfections, the balance sheet effect of a devaluation implies an increase in the cost of credit, a fall in aggregate demand, and hence a contraction in economic activity 5 . This mechanism may be particularly strong in emerging countries since these countries generally borrow in foreign currency and are subject to sharp real exchange rate depreciations (or devaluations).
Recent theoretical studies have developed the above argument in some detail; noteworthy contributions include Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) , and Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) . The empirical evidence is, however, scarce at this point, although sorely needed since the theory by itself cannot determine whether the balance sheet effect of a devaluation is strong enough to reverse conventional wisdom.
This paper is an attempt to investigate the issue empirically. Our approach is to test whether balance sheet effects that emerge when the value of the external debt burden changes due to a real exchange depreciation significantly increase country risk in emerging countries. An affirmative answer is supported by our evidence.
For a panel of emerging economies in the last decade, we construct a "balance sheet" variable by computing the change in the value of the debt service associated with unanticipated real depreciations. We find that this variable is significant in explaining the variation of the cost of credit in those economies. We argue that our findings are not due to the effect of the amount of debt owed, and that the impact of the balance sheet effects of a real depreciation are stronger during economic crises and in countries with higher degrees of financial imperfections. These results should obviously be corroborated by further work, but seem highly stimulating and relevant to current debates.
The only paper that attempts an empirical exercise similar to ours is Bleakley and Cowan (2002) but it differs from ours in substantial ways. Bleakley and Cowan investigated a panel of firms from Latin America countries, and hence focused on micro data, as opposed to our work which is based on macro data. Bleakley and Cowan focused on investment, not the cost of credit. And, finally, their results are quite different: they found that firms with a larger amount of debt in dollar tend to invest more after a real depreciation, which runs contrary to the implications of the recent literature on credit constraints although the authors do not control for the degree of constraints for each firm. Our results, in turn, are much more supportive of that literature.
Section 2 offers a simple theoretical framework for our empirical test. Section 3 describes the data used and the empirical challenges. Section 4 offers the findings. Finally, Section 5 draws some preliminary conclusions and points to venues of future research.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
This section illustrates with a very simple theoretical framework the implications of recent theories on the interaction between balance sheet effects, dollarized liabilities, and exchange rates that justify our empirical focus. Consider a small open economy, indexed by i , whose residents borrow in the international capital markets. One may assume that the borrowing amount is fixed in terms of an international currency (henceforth called dollar). We denote by it the spread between the interest rate charged to that borrower and the world interest rate, or risk premium for short. The key question we address is whether there is an inverse relation between the risk premium and the value of the borrower´s own funds available for investment:
where is a strictly decreasing function and it denotes real net worth, that is, net worth measured in terms of the country´s final (consumption or investment) goods. Final goods are assumed to be a composite of tradables and nontradables.
Equation (1) is the hallmark of recent theories of balance sheet effects and financial imperfections and can be justified in at least two different but related ways. The first one, associated with the work of Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) , and Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001) , and others, stresses the effects of a devaluation on the financial agency costs due to asymmetric information or imperfect enforcement: the smaller a borrower´s net worth, the more he or she needs to rely on external finance, which increases agency costs. Since the international capital market is assumed to be competitive and foreign lenders base their decisions on their opportunity cost of funds, higher expected agency costs raise the risk premium. A slightly different view, associated with Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ,
is that the costs of borrowing decrease in the value of the collateral that the borrower can post against the loan. If collateral is given by the real value of the borrower´s net assets, (1) follows.
Recent international macro models take the above formulation as a starting point, and add the observation that international debt obligations are very often "dollarized", that is, denominated in foreign currency. Under such circumstances, which are typical of emerging economies, a real exchange depreciation can easily reduce the dollar value of domestic net worth so that, under (1), the cost of credit must increase relative to the world interest rate (i.e., the country risk must rise).
To see how that implication is derived, let us assume that the net worth can be expressed as 
is interpreted as the change in the value of country's i's external debt burden due to an unanticipated real exchange depreciation in period t. As already mentioned, our key concern is whether the impact of the balance sheet effects on the cost of credit, the coefficient , is significantly positive and whether this depends on the degree of financial imperfections.
THE DATA
The empirical implementation of equation (5) involves several data difficulties, the main one being related to measuring the risk premium variable ( it ). That variable represents, in theory, the cost of credit on the marginal funding for country i during year t. In practice, unfortunately, available measures of the cost of credit seem very far from that ideal. The best available proxy, and the most widely used in the literature, are the returns implicit in the Emerging Markets Bonds Indices (EMBI), provided by JP Morgan. For each country and year in that dataset we construct a credit spread measure (COSTBORROWING) by subtracting total returns on US Treasury bonds from that country's EMBI returns. We limited our sample to countries with at least four observations of EMBI returns, which reduces the sample to twenty-seven countries. Ten of them have data from 1993, when the EMBI started being produced and all countries have data for the last year, 2002. Given this data constraints, the total sample is composed of 203 yearly observations. Table 1 in Appendix 1 lists the countries and the data availability while Appendix 2 offers a detailed description of the variable definitions and sources.
To proxy for the balance sheet term it S in equation (5), we construct a variable called BALANCESHEET, which is an interaction term, namely the product of EXSURPRISE and DEBT*. EXSURPRISE equals the change in i's real exchange rate (EX as defined in Appendix 2) between year t and year t-1, and DEBT* is the US dollar value of i's debt service due in year t divided by i's GDP in 1995 prices. The latter is done to avoid country's size determining the results.
Finally, (5) includes the vector 1 it Y of predetermined variables that help predict the risk premium in t. In principle, any variable available in period t-1 may be included in that vector, as long as it helps predicting it . We limited attention, however, to the level of the risk premium in t-1 (COSTBORROWING_1), given its high persistence and the real GDP in t-1 (RGDP_1).
We also include other control variables, which are: the global JP Morgan index for emerging countries (EMBIWORLD), as a proxy for the cost of borrowing for all emerging countries as asset class; and the level of international reserves in real terms (RRES). At a later stage, we shall also include the increase in the dollar value of exports ( EXPORT) to control for changes in other aspects of net wealth related to the real exchange depreciation. This will reduce the probability of a bias when estimating because of omitted variables.
As a first step, in estimating via OLS, we assume that the error term it is uncorrelated with it S or, in other words, that unexpected changes in net worth, other than the balance sheet effect of a real depreciation, are uncorrelated with the latter. Given the potential restrictiveness of this hypothesis, we test that the coefficient does not change when potentially relevant variables (such as EXPORT) is included in the regression. The fact that does not change can be taken as tentative confirmation that the potential omitted variables problem is not biasing the coefficient of our objective variable (BALANCESHEET). In any event, we do include EXPORT as additional regressors since they are found significant and add useful information. Table 2 in Appendix 1 presents some descriptive statistics, and Table 3 the matrix of correlations between the different variables. Observe the relatively high correlation (0.43) between COSTBORROWING and BALANCESHEET; interestingly, COSTBORROWING has a lower correlation with the total amount borrowed, proxied by the debt service in current prices (DEBT*). Although no firm conclusions can be drawn from simple bi-variate correlations, it suggests, as emphasized in the theory, that it is not the amount borrowed that influences the external cost of borrowing but rather unexpected changes in net wealth. On the other hand, the correlation between COSTBORROWING and the change in real exchange rate, EXSURPRISE, is the highest of the three. Finally, the correlation of the dependent variable in t and in t-1 is very high (0.71), showing that stationarity may be an issue. Also in line with the literature, the two control variables related to positive wealth effects ( EXPORT and RRES) are negatively correlated with the dependent variable (-0.12 and -0.06, respectively). 
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS

1. Basic Findings
The results are obtained by estimating equation (5) with pooled data. In the first regression, which is given by the middle column of Table 1 , the coefficient of BALANCESHEET is positive and significant at the one percent level. Its magnitude is also reasonable in economic terms: it implies that if there is an unexpected devaluation that makes a country's debt service increase by one percent of its 1995 GDP, the cost of credit will increase by about 61 basis points, ceteris paribus. The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign. The level of reserves reduces the cost of borrowing and is significant at the 5% level. The coefficients of EMBIWORLD and COSTBORROWING_1 are positive.
In a second regression, given by the rightmost column in Table 1 , we included the year to year change in exports ( EXPORT) as an explanatory variable. As stressed earlier, our aim is to test whether the significance of BALANCESHEET in the regression hinges on an omitted variable problem, stemming from the effect of an unexpected variation in the real exchange rate on components of net wealth other than the value of the debt service. The most obvious such component is the increase in exports due to the impact of a real devaluation on competitiveness.
While the inclusion of EXPORT results in a lower estimate for the BALANCESHEET coefficient, the fall is relatively small: in fact a Wald test, shown at the bottom of 
OLS estimation
The next question we address is whether the significance of the BALANCESHEET variable is really due to the impact of debt accumulation on the cost of credit and not to the presence of balance sheet effects. In a way, we are testing whether the assumption of debt being predetermined is key for the results. To this end, in Table 2 we ask what, if any, is the impact of including measures of the accumulation of debt as explanatory variables in our regression.
Column I reproduces our basic regression for convenience. In column II, the change in debt service in US dollar ( DEBT*) is included as an additional regressor. We find that DEBT* is not significant and that the coefficient of BALANCESHEET is not significantly affected. The same happens when we include the real value of the debt service (DEBT*), as indicated in column III. Hence the evidence is supportive of the view that, an increase in the amount borrowed is not as relevant for the risk premium as unexpected changes in the debt service due to the variation in the real exchange rate (the balance sheet effect). 
Robustness Issues
An obvious objection to these results is that there may be a simultaneity bias. Our regression equation (5) may be only one of the equations determining equilibrium; other equations may imply that variations in the cost of borrowing affect exchange rates contemporaneously. In such a case, our estimate of the coefficient of BALANCESHEET can only be interpreted as a reduced form one, and not as giving the impact of balance sheet effects on the cost of credit.
To determine whether a simultaneity bias is a significant concern, we perform a Hausman test, which requires finding an adequate instrument for BALANCESHEET. But this implies finding an instrument for EXSURPRISE only, as the debt service is assumed to be predetermined. Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Instrument for the variable "balancesheet" is Debt * Inflation Another possible objection to our basic regressions is that the dependent variable, COSTBORROWING, may not be stationary. From Table 3 in Appendix 1, we know that COSTBORROWING is very persistent. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that credit spreads are integrated of order greater than zero. In any case, we run the baseline regression with COSTBORROWING in differences. As Table 4 shows, the results are not significantly affected, and BALANCESHEET remains significant at a 5% level. 
OLS estimation
Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
On the Impact of Crises and Financial Development
As shown in Table 2 , BALANCESHEET has a large variance. It may therefore be of interest to check whether its significance in explaining the credit spread is due to the impact of outliers. This may also be noteworthy, given the prominence of crises episodes in the recent debate and in the generation of the theory.
In Table 6 we exclude observations associated with 5% of the extreme values of EXSURPRISE (column II), DEBT* (column III) and BALANCESHEET (column IV). The coefficient of BALANCESHEET drops to the 10% level when the extreme values of BALANCESHEET or EXSURPRISE are excluded but remains significant at the 1% level when those of DEBT* are excluded. These results show that large real exchange rate surprises (treated here as outliers) are particularly detrimental in terms of an increase in the external cost of borrowing. This suggests that the balance sheet effects may be greatest at times of crisis, when large devaluations occur.
Large amounts of debt do not appear to be as nearly as important. Finally, it is important to recall that the theory assigns primary importance to the degree of financial imperfections in explaining why a reduction in net worth increases the country risk premium. So far we have implicitly assumed that countries are similar in the degree of their financial imperfections, but it is interesting to explore the consequences of dropping that assumption.
As a first exercise, a measure of creditor rights, compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), is used as a proxy for the degree of financial imperfections. This variable has yearly variation. CREDITORIGHTS_TOTAL is the original ICRG classification, which can vary from 0 to 12, while CREDITORIGHTS is a simplified version composed of 3 possible levels to classify countries. As Table 7 shows, both variables negatively, and significantly, affect the sovereign risk premium, other things given. Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% In a second exercise, we divide the sample into three groups, from worst to better financial imperfections (proxied by the CREDITORIGHTS), and estimate our basic regression for each group. As shown in Table 8 , only in the group with the worst creditor rights do balance sheet effects significantly increase the risk premium, other things given. This result expected from our theoretical framework, where changes in net worth affect the risk premium only in the presence of financial imperfections. 
OLS estimation
FINAL REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper tests empirically whether, as implied by recent theories of imperfect capital markets, there is a negative relationship between a country's risk premium and balance sheet effects, in the presence of financial imperfections. We find evidence that balance sheet effects (i.e., the increase in the debt service because of an unexpected real depreciation) significantly raise the risk premium, other things given. On the whole, the evidence is supportive. However, further research should be directed at confirming or refuting our results.
If one accepts our evidence that balance sheet effects are significant for the cost of credit, the policy implications are severe. There is an argument to avoid sharp changes in the real exchange rate unless financial imperfections are small, in the line suggested by Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) in the literature of original sin.
Given the frequency of large real exchange rate depreciations in emerging countries, this issue is clearly worth a deeper look. There are several venues for further research. First, an analysis of the net effect of a real depreciation seems warranted, which includes both balance sheet effects and competitiveness into one single coefficient. In our study both coefficients are significant (except when fixed effects are included which takes away the significance of the competitiveness factor) and with the expected opposite sign but we cannot say which one is larger. Second, the impact of domestic dollarization and its interrelation with external dollarization needs further theoretical analysis. Third, it would be interesting to test whether a particular exchange rate regime reduces the impact of balance sheet effects on country risk, as argued by Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) . Finally, the definition of financial imperfections, key in these types of models, would also need to be expanded from creditor rights to broader measures. 
Stylized facts and robustness tests
Data sources and definitions of variables
Below we list the variables and sources used for this study, as well as the transformations we have made to the data . The data are annual and cover the periods and countries shown in Table 1 .
Dependent variable:
* Country risk premium or spread in the external cost of borrowing (COSTBORROWING):
equals returns for U.S. dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, Eurobonds, and U.S. dollardenominated local markets instruments for emerging markets minus total returns for U.S.
Treasury bonds with similar maturity (the stripped yields of the Emerging Markets Bond Index, EMBI, for each country).
Source: JP Morgan.
Objective variables:
* Total debt service index (DEBT*): equals the sum of gross interest payments due on external debt and amortization paid on medium/long-term external debt in U.S. dollars divided by the nominal GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars to take into account the relative size of the country. 
